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I.

INTRODUCTION

On January 6, 2021, Congress assembled to perform “one of its most

Lindsay Dreyer is a third-year law student at Mitchell Hamline School of Law. The author
worked for Senator Klobuchar in the Senate Judiciary Committee during the spring of 2021,
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solemn constitutional responsibilities”: the electoral count. 2 As the House
and the Senate convened in their respective rooms, and with Vice President
Mike Pence presiding, President Donald Trump held the “Save America
Rally” in the Ellipse within the National Mall just a short distance from the
Capitol Building. 3 For nearly an hour, President Trump spoke to the crowd,
reiterating his claim that the Democrats stole the election and “exhort[ing]
the crowd to ‘fight much harder’ to ‘stop the steal’ and ‘take back our
country.’” 4 At the end of his speech, President Trump called on his
supporters to march to the Capitol, 5 and at 1:30 p.m. they began their ascent
up Constitution Avenue. 6 Around 2:15 p.m., the pro-Trump mob breached
the Capitol building. 7 For hours, chaos ensued. Congressmembers were
evacuated as rioters attacked Capitol law enforcement with
“sledgehammers, baseball bats, hockey sticks, crutches, flagpoles, police
shields, and fire extinguishers.” 8 Once inside, the rioters vandalized the
building: “They left bullet marks in the walls, looted art, smeared feces in
hallways, and destroyed monuments.” 9 As the Capitol was seized for the first
time since 1814, 10 President Trump was silent. For more than three hours,
President Trump merely watched, described by those around him as
“borderline enthusiastic,” 11 before releasing a scripted video, telling the
insurrectionists, “We love you, you’re very special. . . . But go home and go
home in peace.” 12 Five people died during the insurrection, and more than

PROCEEDINGS OF THE UNITED STATES SENATE IN THE IMPEACHMENT OF PRESIDENT
DONALD JOHN TRUMP, PART I: TRIAL MEMORANDUM OF THE UNITED STATES HOUSE OF
REPRESENTATIVES, 117TH CONG., 1ST SESS., S. DOC. NO. 117–2, at 23 (2021) [hereinafter
House Brief].
Id. at 24.
Id. at 42.
President Trump concluded his speech on January 6 by saying, “[W]e’re going to walk
down Pennsylvania Avenue. I love Pennsylvania Avenue. And we’re going to the Capitol . .
. So let’s walk down Pennsylvania Avenue.” Brian Naylor, Read Trump’s Jan. 6 Speech, A
Key
Part
of
Impeachment
Trial,
NPR
(Feb.
10,
2021),
https://www.npr.org/2021/02/10/966396848/read-trumps-jan-6-speech-a-key-part-ofimpeachment-trial [https://perma.cc/26AS-3DW9].
Shelly Tan, Youjin Shin & Danielle Rindler, How One of America’s Ugliest Days
Unraveled Inside and Outside the Capitol, WASH. POST (Jan. 9, 2021),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/nation/interactive/2021/capitol-insurrection-visualtimeline/ [https://perma.cc/Z4E2-H8X3].
2

3
4
5

6

7

Id.

8

House Brief, supra note 2, at 44.

9

Id. at 48.

British troops set the U.S. Capitol on fire during the War of 1812. Burning of Washington,
U.S.
SENATE,
https://www.senate.gov/artandhistory/history/common/generic/August_Burning_Washingto
n.htm [https://perma.cc/P7D7-XKMP].
House Brief, supra note 2, at 51.
Id. at 54.
10

1814,

11
12
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seven hundred individuals have since been arrested. 13
The entire country, and much of the world, 14 watched the events unfold
on January 6. It will remain etched in our minds and engraved in history as
one of America’s ugliest days. 15 The worst fear of the Framers of the
Constitution had been realized: the President of the United States refused
to concede the election and called on his supporters to attack the legislature.
One could not have imagined a more blatantly impeachable act. The House
moved swiftly, voting to impeach President Trump on January 12, 2021, by
a vote of 232 to 197, and charging the President with incitement of
insurrection. 16 On February 9, 2021, the impeachment trial began, and on
February 13, President Trump was acquitted. 17 This result, though
disappointing, was not altogether surprising. Republicans had vehemently
expressed their opposition to impeachment proceedings from the
beginning. 18 Still, both sides agreed that President Trump’s actions were
inexcusable, with House Minority Leader Kevin McCarthy going so far as
to state that “[t]he president bears responsibility for [the] attack on
Congress.” 19 America was left wondering, how can the president of the
United States be condemned by both sides of Congress for inciting an attack
on the Capitol only to be acquitted of the incitement charge? The answer
Madison Hall, Skye Gould, Rebecca Harrington, Jacob Shamsian, Azmi Haroun, Taylor
Ardrey & Erin Snodgrass, 761 People Have Been Charged in the Capitol Insurrection So
Far. This Searchable Table Shows Them All, INSIDER, https://www.insider.com/all-the-uscapitol-pro-trump-riot-arrests-charges-names-2021-1 [https://perma.cc/P77T-MAS5] (Jan.
26, 2022).
The Canadian Prime Minister, Justin Trudeau, tweeted, “Canadians are deeply disturbed
and saddened by the attack on democracy in the United States.” @JustinTrudeau, TWITTER
(Jan. 6, 2021, 5:17 PM), https://twitter.com/JustinTrudeau/status/1346959061862912004
[https://perma.cc/HYT6-425U]. The British Prime Minister, Boris Johnson, described the
scene as “disgraceful.” @BorisJohnson, TWITTER (Jan. 6, 2021, 3:06 PM),
https://twitter.com/BorisJohnson/status/1346926138057220103 [https://perma.cc/4LDKASFW].
Tan et al., supra note 6.
Weiyi Cai, A Step-by-Step Guide to the Second Impeachment of Donald J. Trump, N.Y.
TIMES (Feb. 13, 2021), https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2021/02/08/us/politics/trumpsecond-impeachment-timeline.html [https://perma.cc/7AE6-J4AV].
13

14

15
16

Id.
See Mike DeBonis & Seung Min Kim, Nearly All GOP Senators Vote Against
Impeachment Trial for Trump, Signaling Likely Acquittal, WASH. POST (Jan. 26, 2021),
17
18

https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/gop-senators-to-question-basis-for-trumpimpeachment-signaling-likely-acquittal/2021/01/26/cd7397dc-6002-11eb-906107abcc1f9229_story.html [https://perma.cc/2J24-LEPN] (noting that the vote against the
impeachment trial “demonstrated the continued sway Trump holds over GOP officeholders,
even after his exit from the White House under a historic cloud caused by his refusal to
concede the November election.”).
Jennifer Haberkorn, House Minority Leader McCarthy Blames Trump for Riot but
Opposes
Impeachment,
L.A.
TIMES
(Jan.
13,
2021),
https://www.latimes.com/politics/story/2021-01-13/kevin-mccarthy-blames-trump-for-riotbut-opposes-impeachment [https://perma.cc/ZT4J-CFX2].
19
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has to do with both the erosion of the impeachment tool and the growth of
hyperpartisanship in America. This Paper attempts to explain the
degradation of impeachment as a useful check on the executive branch and
the dangerous effect an unchecked executive branch can have on our
country.
Part II of this Paper outlines the history of impeachment, from its
British roots to its incorporation into the U.S. Constitution and early
application in America. Part III explains the elements of a successful
impeachment: (1) a divided government; (2) broad public support; and (3)
a threat to our constitutional order. Part IV applies those elements to the
second impeachment of Donald Trump and explains why President
Trump’s defenses were meritless. The impeachment elements have
become hurdles the country must overcome before utilizing impeachment
to constrain the power of the executive. Part V highlights the rise of
hyperpartisanship and normalization of impeachment. Although once a
useful deterrent, impeachment has been overcome by hyperpartisanship,
and the result is a growing executive branch with little incentive to play by
the rules. 20 Part VI describes ways in which the impeachment power could
be strengthened and other checks that can be used to temper the power of
the executive branch. Finally, the Paper proposes that the real issue
underlying the growing power of the executive branch is not a dysfunctional
impeachment tool, but rather, a dysfunctional Congress. 21
II.

HISTORY OF IMPEACHMENT

A. British Roots
The concept of impeachment as a check on government power can be
traced back to England. The king was immune from all official government
action, including impeachment, but the king’s ministers and other
government officials were not. 22 Thus, while the king himself could not be
impeached, impeachment could still serve as an important check on the
king’s power. The impeachment power proved to be an essential tool of
Parliament as it struggled to constrain the king. 23 Through impeaching the
king’s ministers, Parliament was able to exercise some measure of control
over the monarchy. 24 This power struggle between Parliament and the king
20
21
22

See infra Part V.
See infra Section VI.B.
Joseph Isenbergh, Impeachment and Presidential Immunity from Judicial Process, 18

YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 53, 57 (1999).
STAFF OF S. COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 93D CONG., REP. ON THE CONSTITUTIONAL
GROUNDS FOR PRESIDENTIAL IMPEACHMENT, at 2249 (Comm. Print 1974),
https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/GPO-HPREC-DESCHLERS-V3/pdf/GPO-HPRECDESCHLERS-V3-5-6.pdf [https://perma.cc/CTR4-SHXQ].
23

24

Id.
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peaked in 1649 with the execution of Charles I and the creation of the
Commonwealth. 25 Leading up to the execution, Parliament attempted to
restrain King Charles I’s power by impeaching and removing the his closest
ministers. 26
The impeachment power in England was an expansive one.
Impeachment applied in cases of “high treason,” “misdemeanors,”
“malversations,” and “high Crimes and Misdemeanors.” 27 The phrase “high
Crimes and Misdemeanors” originated in 1386 during the impeachment of
Michael de la Pole, the King’s Chancellor and Earl of Suffolk. 28 De la Pole
was charged with “breaking a promise he made to the full Parliament to
execute” a parliamentary ordinance and “failing to expend a sum that
Parliament had directed to be used to ransom the town of Ghent.” 29 The
phrase “high Crimes and Misdemeanors” encompassed both political and
criminal offenses, and it was this phrase that was often utilized to constrain
ministers of the king who disobeyed or deceived Parliament. 30
The remedy for impeachment was not limited to removal from office
or disqualification from future office. 31 Those impeached were subject to
“the full range of criminal penalties,” including the death penalty. 32
Additionally, impeachment was not limited to government officials. 33 Private
parties could commit impeachable acts and be convicted of those acts by
Parliament. 34 In this way, impeachment was expansive in its reach and
consequence.

B. Constitutional Convention
When establishing the American government, the Framers of the
Constitution looked to the British concept of impeachment. Rather than
using impeachment to indirectly temper the president’s power, as was done
in Britain, the Framers decided to extend the impeachment power to
directly reach the office of the president. 35 The Framers envisioned
25
26
27
28
29
30

Id.
See id.
Id. at 2250.
Id.
Id. at 2251.
Id. The second time the phrase “high Crimes and Misdemeanors” appeared was in 1450,

during the impeachment of William de la Pole, Duke of Suffolk. De la Pole was charged
with “advising the King to grant liberties and privileges to certain persons to the hindrance of
the due execution of the laws.” Id. While it was de la Pole who was impeached, the
impeachment served to punish the King for his abuse of power. Id.
Harold J. Kent, Can President Trump Be Impeached as Mr. Trump? Exploring the
Temporal Dimension of Impeachments, 95 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 537, 540 (2020).
31

32
33
34
35

Id.
Id.
Id.
See STAFF OF S. COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, supra note 23, at 2252–53.
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impeachment serving as an essential check on the president’s executive
authority. 36 While the king of Great Britain was sacred and untouchable, the
Framers wanted the American president to be held accountable and, if
necessary, impeached and removed from office. 37 While the Framers
expanded impeachment to include the president, they decided to confine
the power to “[t]he President, Vice President, and all civil officers,”
excluding private citizens from its scope. 38 Thus, impeachment was a check
on government power only, not on the general public. 39
The Framers next had to determine the body of offenses for which the
president and other civil officers could be impeached. At the time, there
were no federal crimes, only a body of common law offenses. 40 Many
delegates suggested that impeachment should apply to offenses outside of
the common law, urging the inclusion of offenses such as
“maladministration,” “corrupt administration,” and “neglect of duty.” 41
Madison objected to the term “maladministration,” arguing that “[s]o vague
a term will be equivalent to a tenure during the pleasure of the Senate.” 42
The term “maladministration” was then replaced with the phrase “high
Crimes and Misdemeanors” with no conversation as to how exactly the
phrases differed. 43
Despite the lack of a clear definition, evidence suggests the phrase
“high Crimes and Misdemeanors” was meant to embrace more than just
common law offenses. 44 The Framers borrowed the phrase itself directly
from the British usage of the term, which included a wide range of political
offenses, including abuse of power and neglect of duty. 45 Still, the Framers
feared that impeachment power would be exploited by political factions. 46
Alexander Hamilton expressed his concern that the impeachment power
would “be regulated more by the comparative strength of parties, than by

Id. (“Impeachment was to be one of the central elements of executive responsibility in the
framework of the new government as [the Framers] conceived it.”).
Id. at 2254.
U.S. CONST. art. II, § 4.

36

37
38
39

See id.

Frank O. Bowman, III & Stephen L. Sepinuck, “High Crimes & Misdemeanors”: Defining
the Constitutional Limits on Presidential Impeachment, 72 S. CAL. L. REV. 1517, 1523–24
(1999).
Id. at 1524.
40

41
42
43
44

Id.
Id.
Id. at 1525; see THE FEDERALIST NO. 64, at 360 (Alexander Hamilton) (The Colonial Press

ed., 1901) (writing about impeachable offenses, Hamilton stated, “They are of a nature which
may with peculiar propriety be denominated ‘political,’ as they relate chiefly to injuries done
immediately to the society itself”).
See supra Section II.A.
See LAURENCE TRIBE & JOSHUA MATZ, TO END A PRESIDENCY: THE POWER OF
IMPEACHMENT 105 (Basic Books 2018).
45
46

591

592

MITCHELL HAMLINE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 48:2

the real demonstrations of innocence or guilt.” 47 For that reason, the
Framers struggled when determining who should have the authority to
impeach.
First, Edmund Randolph suggested that the judiciary handle
impeachments. 48 Then Charles Pickney proposed that a “House of
Delegates” would bring impeachment charges that would be tried in the
Senate and judiciary. 49 John Dickinson argued that impeachment should be
“left in the hands of the States” and suggested officials be removable “on the
request of a majority of the Legislatures of individual States.” 50 For over
three months, the delegates debated who should have the impeachment
power, jumping back and forth between different combinations of the state
legislatures, the House, the Senate, and the judiciary until finally they settled
on impeachment by the House and conviction by the Senate. 51 This back
and forth demonstrates the Framers’ awareness of the significance of
impeachment power and underscores their fear that such power would be
abused.
Lastly, the Framers narrowed the remedy for impeachment. While
Parliament’s impeachment power allowed for criminal sanctions after an
impeachment conviction, the Framers decided to limit the remedy to
“removal from Office, and disqualification to hold and enjoy any Office of
honor, Trust or Profit under the United States.” 52 Those impeached and
convicted were still subject to criminal penalties outside of the impeachment
proceedings. 53 In that way, the Framers explicitly distinguished an
impeachment proceeding from a criminal proceeding.
III.

ELEMENTS OF A SUCCESSFUL IMPEACHMENT

No president has been impeached and removed from office. Still,
instances where presidents have been nearly impeached, or impeached but
not removed, shed light on what a successful impeachment would require.
Three patterns emerge from an analysis of our country’s use of the
impeachment power. First, impeachment requires a divided government. 54
That is, impeachment will only be successful where the parties that control
both Houses of Congress are different than the party in control of the White
House. 55 Second, impeachment requires broad public support. 56 And third,
47
48
49
50
51

Id.
Id. at 114.
Id. at 114–15.
Id. at 115.
Id. at 115–16.

U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3, cl. 7.
See id. (“[B]ut the Party convicted shall nevertheless be liable and subject to Indictment,
Trial, Judgment and Punishment, according to Law.”).
See infra Section III.A.

52
53

54
55
56

Id.
See infra Section III.B.
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impeachment requires a threat to our constitutional order. 57 All three
elements must be present for the impeachment tool to be effective.

A. Divided Government
The Framers of the Constitution saw separation of powers as the
foundation of American government. In a 1775 letter to Richard Henry
Lee, John Adams proposed creating three branches of government. 58 He
wrote, “It is by ballancing [sic] each of these Powers against the other two,
that the Effort in humane Nature towards Tyranny, can alone be checked
and restrained and any degree of Freedom preserved in the Constitution.” 59
The separation of powers was “designed to make parties ineffective” 60 by
creating a maze-like system that would thwart any party’s attempt to power
grab. But increased partisanship has made separation of powers
vulnerable. 61 This is most apparent when the president’s party also controls
both Houses of Congress, which is often referred to as a “unified
government.” 62 Justice Jackson explained the danger of a unified
government in Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer: “Party loyalties
and interests, sometimes more binding than law, extend [the president’s]
effective control into branches of government other than his own, and he
often may win, as a political leader, what he cannot command under the
Constitution.” 63 The executive branch benefits the most from a unified
government. When the president’s party controls the White House and
both Houses of Congress, “the power of the Presidency is effectively
unchecked.” 64
In fact, the House has only impeached two presidents before President
Donald Trump, and both instances occurred during a divided government. 65
The impeachment of Presidents Andrew Johnson and Bill Clinton occurred
when Democrats controlled the White House and Republicans controlled
both Houses of Congress. 66 Democrat Andrew Johnson’s impeachment
57

See infra Section III.C.

Letter from John Adams to Richard Henry Lee (Nov. 15, 1775),
https://founders.archives.gov/documents/Adams/06-03-02-0163
[https://perma.cc/Q958Z25B].

58

59

Id.

Lee Drutman, There is No Separation of Powers Without Divided Government, VOX (Jan.
3, 2018), https://www.vox.com/polyarchy/2018/1/3/16844848/separation-of-powers-dividedgovernment [https://perma.cc/7ZWS-BM2S].
See infra Section V.A.
Id.; see William P. Marshall, Eleven Reasons Why Presidential Power Inevitably Expands
and Why It Matters, 88 B.U. L. REV. 505, 519 (2008) (“[W]hen the President’s party controls
the Congress, he or she can proceed virtually uncontested.”).
343 U.S. 579, 654 (1952) (Jackson, J., concurring).
Marshall, supra note 62.
Daryl J. Levinson & Richard H. Pildes, Separation of Parties, Not Powers, 119 HARV. L.
REV. 2311, 2345 (2006).
60

61
62

63
64
65

66

Id.
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occurred during a period of extraordinary partisan domination in Congress:
Republicans controlled 57 out of 66 seats in the Senate and 173 out of 220
seats in the House. 67 When Democrat Bill Clinton was impeached,
Republicans controlled 55 out of 100 seats in the Senate and 226 out of 435
seats in the House. 68 Additionally, the Watergate investigation occurred
when the Democrats controlled Congress and Republicans controlled the
White House. 69 While Nixon resigned before the House impeached him,
there is little doubt that an impeachment would have been pursued. 70
Given the “party loyalties and interests” described by Justice Jackson, 71
impeachment has only been used as a check on Executive power during a
divided government. As political scientist Lee Drutman candidly noted,
“There is no separation of powers without divided government.” 72

B. Importance of Public Support
Even with a divided government, impeachment will not succeed unless
the public at large has lost faith in the president’s ability to fulfill his or her
duties. The Reagan presidency best illustrates this fact.
Ronald Reagan became the 40th president of the United States in
1981. He was a charismatic former actor who ran on a platform of
anticommunism and “supply-side” economics. 73 President Reagan won the
election by a landslide, with a final electoral college vote of 489 to 49. 74
Then, in 1984, he won reelection. 75
In the 1980s, President Reagan supported the Contras rebel group in

67

Id. at 2367.
105th

Congress
(1997-1999),
THE
CONG.
PROJECT,
https://www.thecongressproject.com/105th-congress-19971999
[https://perma.cc/8DYSEKL9].
Levinson & Pildes, supra note 65, at 2345.
Richard Lyons & William Chapman, Judiciary Committee Approves Article to Impeach
President
Nixon,
27
to
11,
WASH.
POST
(July
28,
1974),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/national/longterm/watergate/articles/072874-1.htm
[https://perma.cc/TJE9-38AS].
Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 654 (1952) (Jackson, J.,
concurring).
Drutman, supra note 60.
Presidency
Of
Ronald
Reagan:
Domestic
Policies,
BRITANNICA,
https://www.britannica.com/biography/Ronald-Reagan/Presidency#ref214230
[https://perma.cc/3HAG-NDS6].
Ronald
Reagan:
Election
Of
1980,
BRITANNICA,
https://www.britannica.com/biography/Ronald-Reagan/Governorship-ofCalifornia#ref214227 [https://perma.cc/3MX5-SXNH].
Frank Newport, Jeffrey M. Jones & Lydia Saad, Ronald Reagan From the People’s
Perspective:
A
Gallup
Poll
Review,
GALLUP
(June
7,
2004),
https://news.gallup.com/poll/11887/ronald-reagan-from-peoples-perspective-gallup-pollreview.aspx [https://perma.cc/Z5ZN-VJK7].
68

69
70

71

72
73

74

75
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Nicaragua. 76 Congress forbade any efforts to fund the Contras and their
efforts to overthrow the government in Nicaragua. 77 In November 1985,
President Reagan authorized a secret initiative to sell military weapons to
Iran in exchange for the country’s help in securing the release of American
hostages in Lebanon. 78 The deal broke a number of trade embargoes and
contradicted President Reagan’s public statement that he would not
negotiate with the Iranian terrorists. 79 In addition, a portion of the $48
million earned from the arms sale was diverted to a secret fund to purchase
weapons for the Contras, violating congressional laws prohibiting aid. 80
When details of the Iran-Contra Affair came to light, the public
demanded answers, and “Reagan built a defense on negligence and
ignorance.” 81 Miraculously, the public believed him. This was in part due to
President Reagan’s ability to shift the focus to his subordinates, and his
argument that there was no “smoking gun.” 82 Nevertheless, evidence clearly
showed that President Reagan ordered the deal and was involved in the
planning. 83 President Reagan “us[ed] public assets to purchase indirect
sustenance for an activity that Congress had specifically prohibited,” and he
continuously violated acts of Congress and lied to cover up his actions. 84 His
actions, apart from being illegal, directly violated the division of power
between the executive and legislative branch.
The Iran-Contra Affair most certainly constituted an impeachable
offense. While some called for impeachment, the House never even
opened an inquiry. 85 A major reason why impeachment was not pursued
was due to the public’s approval of President Reagan. 86 Polls showed that
the American people still trusted the president. 87 Despite all that President
Reagan was accused of, he remained popular, and the call for impeachment
was a rather weak one. 88 Although the government was divided in 1987—
TRIBE & MATZ, supra note 46, at 72.
Doug Rossinow, Politics Saved Ronald Reagan from Impeachment. That Might Happen
Again
for
Donald
Trump.,
WASH.
POST
(Oct.
4,
2019),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/outlook/2019/10/04/politics-saved-ronald-reaganimpeachment-that-might-happen-again-donald-trump/ [https://perma.cc/CSN5-TJ8D].
Andrew Glass, Reagan Explains Secret Sale of Arms to Iran, Nov. 13, 1986, POLITICO
(Nov. 13, 2013), https://www.politico.com/story/2013/11/reagan-explains-secret-sale-ofarms-to-iran-nov-13-1986-099742 [https://perma.cc/B2XQ-XPEL].
TRIBE & MATZ, supra note 46, at 72.
76
77

78

79
80
81
82
83
84
85
86
87
88

Id.
Id.
Rossinow, supra note 77.
Id.
Id.
Id.
See TRIBE & MATZ, supra note 46, at 73.
Id.
Shortly after the public learned about the Iran-Contra affair, “Reagan’s job approval rating
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Democrats controlled both Houses of Congress 89 and Republicans
controlled the White House—the Iran-Contra Affair demonstrated that
impeachment will not be successful unless the president has lost the public’s
confidence.

C. Threat to Constitutional Order
Even with a divided government and public support for impeachment,
one question remains: what is an impeachable act? Since the ratification of
the Constitution, no president has been removed from office by
impeachment; however, on several occasions the House has drafted articles
of impeachment. Moreover, the instances in which the House has chosen
not to draft articles of impeachment also shed light on early America’s
understanding of the impeachment power and what constitutes an
impeachable offense.
As mentioned previously, there was—and still is—some uncertainty as
to exactly which offenses were included in the Constitution’s Impeachment
Clause. 90 During the second impeachment of President Trump, one of the
main defenses during trial was that the power of impeachment is limited
solely to criminal offenses. 91 Aside from the history of the phrase “high
Crimes and Misdemeanors” and the writings of the Framers, Early
America’s use of the Impeachment Clause demonstrates how this defense
lacks merit. 92
In 1804, Vice President Aaron Burr killed Alexander Hamilton,
former Secretary of the U.S. Treasury, during a duel in Weehawken, New
Jersey. 93 Hamilton had allegedly made disparaging comments about Burr. 94
And when Hamilton refused to deny making such comments, Burr
challenged him to a duel. 95 Although dueling was illegal at the time, the two
agreed to meet in secret at a popular dueling ground. 96 With one shot, Burr
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https://history.house.gov/Congressional-Overview/Profiles/100th/ [https://perma.cc/55R3JZYA].
See supra Section II.B.
See infra Section IV.B.1.
See Legal Information Institute, Impeachable Offenses: Historical Background, CORNELL
UNIV.
L.
SCH.,
https://www.law.cornell.edu/constitution-conan/article-2/section4/impeachable-offenses-historical-background [https://perma.cc/T68P-N4BH].
Jeff Wallenfeldt, Burr-Hamilton Duel, BRITANNICA (Oct. 10, 2018),
https://www.britannica.com/event/Burr-Hamilton-duel [https://perma.cc/5TAZ-KTJP].
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fatally struck Hamilton in the abdomen. 97 The public was outraged when
Hamilton’s death was made public, and New Jersey swiftly charged Burr
with murder. 98 Congress, on the other hand, never considered impeaching
Burr. 99 In fact, eleven senators instead called on New Jersey to drop the
murder charge. 100
If impeachment was limited to criminal offenses, the vice president
murdering a former civil officer would most certainly qualify for
impeachment. The fact that Congress did not even consider impeaching
Vice President Burr shows that impeachment was seen as something
different than a punishment for crimes. Congress was more concerned
about the proper functioning of the government. 101 According to the
senators, dismissal of the murder charge was necessary “to facilitate the
public business by relieving [Burr] from the peculiar embarrassments of his
present situation, and the Senate from the distressing imputation thrown on
it.” 102 Although Burr committed a crime, neither Congress nor the general
public was concerned about Burr’s ability to perform his duties as vice
president. 103 Congress instead focused on Burr’s ability to perform his duties
and the public’s confidence rather than the criminality of Burr’s actions. 104
In this way, impeachment is designed to protect the public and not merely
to punish an official for wrongdoing.
Another event in early American history that provides insight into the
impeachment power is the call to impeach President John Tyler. 105 In April
1841, just one month after his inauguration, President William Henry
Harrison passed away, making John Tyler “the first vice president to ascend
to the presidency.” 106 Although both Harrison and Tyler ran on the Whig
ticket, Tyler disagreed with major pieces of the Whig agenda. 107 As
president, Tyler continuously clashed with the Whig-controlled Congress,
often vetoing legislation aligned with Harrison’s campaign promises, such as
the establishment of a central bank. 108 So enraged by President Tyler’s
97
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conduct, members of Congress expelled President Tyler from the Whig
party and discussed impeachment. 109 Then in 1842, the Democrats took
control of Congress, quieting the call for impeachment. 110 When Virginia
Representative, John Minor Botts, introduced an impeachment resolution
on July 10, 1842, the resolution failed. 111 The call to impeach President
Tyler was rooted almost exclusively in partisan politics. 112 He had not abused
his power or neglected his duties as president; rather, he went against the
will of his political party. 113 Calling for impeachment was the Whig party’s
way of retaliating. 114 The failure of the impeachment resolution showed that
the impeachment tool was working as it should. 115 Impeachment was not
meant to be a tool of the majority party, waged when a party disagrees with
the policy decisions of the president. 116 The failure of the resolution was a
direct rebuke of that notion.
The next time an impeachment resolution was brought to the House
floor, it was successful. 117 Vice President Andrew Johnson was sworn in as
president shortly after Abraham Lincoln’s death and in the aftermath of the
Civil War. 118 Johnson became president during one of the most trying times
in our country’s history. 119 He was universally disliked and a staunch racist. 120
Historians have described him as “a rigid, dictatorial racist who was unable
to compromise or to accept a political reality at odds with his own ideas.” 121
Due to his stubbornness and general incompetence, Johnson has been
judged as one of our country’s worst presidents. 122 President Johnson vetoed
every landmark civil rights bill that came before him and favored a more
lenient reconstruction policy. 123 When Congress overrode his veto,
President Johnson “refused to enforce the laws and interpreted them in bad
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opposed the Fourteenth Amendment. Id.
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faith.” 124 He seemed more aligned with the Southerners than those who
elected him and President Lincoln. 125
Fearing that President Johnson would fire the members of Lincoln’s
cabinet, Congress passed the Tenure of Office Act in 1867 over President
Johnson’s veto. 126 The bill prohibited presidents from removing any official
confirmed by the Senate without Senate approval. 127 Believing the bill to be
unconstitutional, President Johnson replaced Secretary of War, Edwin M.
Stanton, with General Ulysses S. Grant, without obtaining the requisite
Senate approval. 128 The Supreme Court refused to rule on the
constitutionality of the bill, and, after pushback by Congress, General Grant
gave the position back to Stanton. 129 In February 1868, President Johnson
again decided to fire Stanton and appointed General Lorenzo Thomas as
Secretary of War. 130
Three days later, President Johnson was impeached. 131 Few
congressmen at the time actually believed President Johnson committed
impeachable offenses. 132 Rather, President Johnson was seen as incompetent
and unfit to be president. 133 Congress felt that his violation of the Tenure of
Office Act was their best chance at removing him. 134 In May 1868, President
Johnson avoided conviction in the Senate by one vote, cast by Republican
Senator Edmund Ross. 135 Although Senator Ross disliked President
Johnson and his policies, Ross knew that violating the Tenure of Office
Act—an Act many thought to be unconstitutional itself—did not rise to the
level of an impeachable offense. 136
The impeachment of President Johnson was about political
expediency. 137 President Johnson greatly impeded Congress’s efforts to deal
with the aftermath of the Civil War and grant rights to the freed slaves in the
South. 138 Congress, and the Republican party at large, felt that Johnson was
a bad president. 139 The House had a hard time pleading its case because its
argument was less about the Tenure of Office Act and more about the
124
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president’s general incompetence. 140 The failed impeachment of President
Johnson teaches us that impeachment will not be successful without an
articulable impeachable offense. Presidents cannot, and should not, be
removed merely because they are disliked. That is not to say that President
Johnson did not commit impeachable acts. He very well may have; 141
however, the offense that the House chose to charge, violation of the
Tenure of Office Act, was insufficient. 142 For that reason, the impeachment
failed. 143
Early American history demonstrates that what constitutes an
impeachable offense is not clear cut. 144 The phrase “high Crimes and
Misdemeanors” is not defined in the Constitution; however, history explains
that the phrase meant something more than a criminal act. 145 Moreover,
impeachment was vulnerable to abuse by political parties. 146 The near
impeachment of President Tyler shows how easily impeachment could be
misused. 147 Finally, the impeachment of President Johnson illustrates the
importance of creating a solid case before impeaching. 148 Even if a president
commits impeachable acts, without a strong case and a specific charge,
impeachment will likely fail. 149

D. The Elements Applied: Watergate
The only time in American history where there appeared to be a
definite impeachable act, widespread public support for impeachment, and
a divided government, was after Watergate. While President Nixon
resigned before the House could vote on an article of impeachment, 150 it is
likely that impeachment would have been successful. 151
140
141
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Late at night on June 17, 1972, five men broke into the Democratic
National Committee headquarters in Washington, D.C. and attempted to
wiretap the building and steal documents. 152 The White House successfully
distanced itself from the burglars initially, and President Nixon was reelected later that year. 153 In March 1973, several of the burglars pled guilty
to conspiracy and other federal charges. 154 Judge John Sirica, who presided
over the burglars’ trials, released a letter written by one of the burglars who
said White House officials pressured him into pleading guilty. 155 As more
information emerged, the Senate voted to create an investigative committee
to look into Watergate. 156 A White House aide told the Senate that President
Nixon taped his Oval Office conversations, and Archibald Cox, the
Watergate special prosecutor, quickly moved to subpoena the tapes. 157
President Nixon refused to turn the tapes over and ordered the Solicitor
General to fire Cox. 158 At this point, the call for impeachment was growing,
and the release of several of the subpoenaed tapes sealed President Nixon’s
fate. 159 The tapes directly connected President Nixon to the burglary and
revealed that he tried to stop the FBI investigation. 160 The House Judiciary
Committee swiftly approved three articles of impeachment, but President
Nixon resigned before the House could vote on the articles. 161
What made Watergate different than other controversial presidential
acts was not that the acts were criminal. President Andrew Johnson and
President Ronald Reagan also likely committed crimes while in office. 162
Neither was the cover up, as President Reagan too had lied and tried to hide
the Iran-Contra arms sale from Congress. 163 What made Watergate different
was that the crime President Nixon committed was an “abuse of public
trust” that “undermined our democracy itself.” 164 Watergate is an excellent
illustration of the type of act that constitutes a “high Crime and
Misdemeanor.” It takes more than a violation of a criminal statute,
obstruction of justice, or a pattern of corruption. 165 A high crime and
misdemeanor must strike at something deeper: it must threaten our
constitutional order. 166 While many past presidential acts did not all rise to
152
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that threshold, there is no question that Watergate did.
Watergate also shows how the threat of impeachment had some teeth.
President Nixon resigned rather than going through an impeachment trial. 167
In that way, even without a conviction, the impeachment power served as a
successful check on executive power.
IV.

SECOND IMPEACHMENT OF PRESIDENT DONALD J. TRUMP

Because it unfolded on television for millions of Americans to watch,
the January 6, 2021, insurrection was perhaps the most graphic abuse of
public trust in our country’s history. In the House’s Brief in support of the
second impeachment of President Trump, the House Impeachment
Managers stated, “If provoking an insurrectionary riot against a Joint Session
of Congress after losing an election is not an impeachable offense, it is hard
to imagine what would be.” 168 For the first time, our country did not have a
peaceful transition of power between presidential administrations. 169
Several Republican Representatives and Senators immediately
condemned President Trump’s actions. Representative Liz Cheney said in
a statement, “There has never been a greater betrayal by a President of the
United States of his office and his oath to the Constitution.” 170 Senate
Majority Leader Mitch McConnell called President Trump “practically and
morally responsible for provoking that event of that day.” 171 Representative
Tom Rice released a statement, saying, “[T]his utter failure is
inexcusable.” 172 And Representative Adam Kinzinger said, “[I]f these
actions—the Article II branch inciting a deadly insurrection against the
Article I branch—are not worthy of impeachment, then what is an
impeachable offense?” 173
Despite these comments, President Trump was acquitted of the

167
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impeachment charges. 174 Senate Majority Leader Mitch McConnell refused
to hold a special session in the Senate, which forced the impeachment trial
to be moved until after Joe Biden’s presidential inauguration, further
complicating the proceedings. 175 Congress’s failure to convict President
Trump exposed deeper issues within our democracy. 176 While President
Trump may have been the wrongdoer, Congress was the enabler. No matter
how blatant and frankly outrageous President Trump’s actions may have
been on January 6, the acquittal confirmed the unyielding nature of the
impeachment tool. The three elements of impeachment—a divided
government, public support, and a threat to constitutional order 177—are not
merely general guidelines of a successful impeachment. Rather, they are
permanent barriers that must be surmounted for impeachment to be
effective. It is not that impeachment might fail without the presence of each
element. Without the unqualified presence of each, impeachment will fail.

A. Elements
As outlined above, there are three general elements of a successful
impeachment: (1) a divided government; (2) public support; and (3) a threat
to our constitutional order. 178 While both parties agreed that January 6
threatened our constitutional order, 179 the country did not have a completely
divided government nor widespread public support for the impeachment. 180

1. Divided Government
The first half of Trump’s presidency occurred under a unified
government. Republicans controlled the White House, House of
Representatives, and Senate. 181 The 2018 midterm election shifted power
within Congress, with Democrats taking control of the House of
Lisa Mascaro, Eric Tucker & Mary Clare Jalonick, Trump Acquitted, Denounced in
Historic Impeachment Trial, AP NEWS (Feb. 13, 2021), https://apnews.com/article/donald-
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Representatives and gaining an additional forty seats. 182 But Republicans
maintained control of the Senate and actually gained two additional seats
after the midterm. 183 The government was technically a divided one after the
2018 midterm election, but it was not divided by much. 184 Democrats
controlled 235 out of the 435 seats in the House, and Republicans
controlled 53 out of the 100 seats in the Senate. 185 While this division was
enough to initiate impeachment proceedings—which actually occurred twice
in the previous two years 186—the fact that Republicans maintained control
over the Senate made conviction unlikely. Without a fully divided
government, meaning both houses controlled by the party opposite the
president, impeachment is futile.

2. Public Support
The next element is public support. Although most of Congress, at the
minimum, at least acknowledged the connection between President
Trump’s actions and the insurrection—even if not going so far as to call it
incitement—much of the country refused to admit even that much. 187 The
New York Times found that half of Republicans did “not accept the verified
fact that conservative protestors, supporters of former President Donald J.
Trump, attacked the U.S. Capitol . . . .” 188 Even more shocking, fifty-five
percent of Republicans believed that the insurrection was started by “‘violent
left-wing protesters trying to make Trump look bad.’” 189 The fact that over
half of Republicans refused to believe the video evidence in front of them
demonstrates just how polarized the parties have become. People on both
sides of the aisle have become so engrained in party politics, and social
media and polarized news sources have only fed into this delusion. 190
It is not surprising then, given these statistics, that the Senate did not
have enough votes to convict the president. Public support is a key element
of impeachment. Impeachment is controlled by Congress, and Congress is
Results from the 2018 Midterm Elections, L.A. TIMES (Nov. 6, 2018),
https://www.latimes.com/projects/la-pol-na-us-general-election-results-2018/
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composed of elected officials who, due to the frequency of elections,
perpetually have reelection in the back of their minds. Congress’s constant
fixation on reelection becomes further evident when looking at the
Republican Senators who voted to convict President Trump: Richard Burr,
Bill Cassidy, Susan Collins, Lisa Murkowski, Mitt Romney, Ben Sasse, and
Pat Toomey. 191 Of the seven, only one—Lisa Murkowski—faces a reelection
in 2022. 192 Two of the senators— Richard Burr and Pat Toomey—are retiring
at the end of their term. 193 In fact, at the time of the impeachment trial, only
three Republican Senators had announced their retirement, 194 and Rob
Portman was the only one who did not vote to convict. 195 The remaining
senators who voted to convict are years away from reelection. 196 Without the
political pressure, senators are more willing to vote against their party. 197
Even so, a majority of the Republican senators in this case still fell in line.
Thus, the rule is confirmed: if a large portion of the public does not support
impeachment, then impeachment will fail.

3. Threat to Our Constitutional Order
The final element of a successful impeachment is a threat to
constitutional order. As history has shown, this requires something more
than a crime or act of corruption. 198 It is hard to imagine a more significant
threat to constitutional order than the attempt of one branch to usurp the
power of another and overturn an election.
As the House Brief explains, President Trump not only invited the
insurrectionists to the Capitol and encouraged them to “fight like hell,” but
he stoked lies about the election results for months before. 199 He convinced
his supporters that the election had been “rigged” and “stolen.” 200 He
Barbara Sprunt, 7 GOP Senators Voted to Convict Trump. Only 1 Faces Voters Next
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pressured Georgia officials to overturn the results and “find 11,780 votes.” 201
When that did not work, he became more desperate. He focused his efforts
on members of Congress, urging them to reject the Electoral College vote
during the January 6 electoral count. 202 All the while, President Trump was
insisting to his base that he won the election and that it was “[s]tatistically
impossible to have lost.” 203
Perhaps most troubling, when the Capitol was breached and as
congressional staff barricaded themselves in their offices and hid under
desks, 204 President Trump did nothing. 205 For hours, President Trump just
watched. 206 Congressional leaders begged him to send help, begged him to
tell his supporters to go home. 207 President Trump did neither. 208 Instead,
President Trump called Senator Mike Lee, as he and the other senators
were in hiding, “not to check on his safety, or assess the security threat, but
to try to persuade him to delay and further obstruct the Electoral College
vote count.” 209
Even during the Capitol breach, President Trump was focused solely
on overturning the election and remaining in power. Vice President Pence
had to step in to facilitate the mobilization of the District of Columbia
National Guard when President Trump refused to do so. 210 Three hours
after the siege began, President Trump released a scripted video, telling the
insurrectionists, “We love you, you’re very special. . . . I know how you feel.
But go home and go home in peace.” 211
As the Editorial Board for the New York Times put it, “The country
was hours away from a full-blown constitutional crisis.” 212 There is no
201
202
203
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question that January 6 constituted a threat to our constitutional order.
January 6 revealed that no matter how great the constitutional threat is,
without the two other elements, impeachment will fail.

B. Constitutionality
Perhaps, some may argue, the impeachment failed not because the
above elements were absent but instead because impeachment in this
instance was unconstitutional. President Trump’s counsel, and many of the
Senate Republicans, brought forth that argument. 213 President Trump’s
counsel made three main arguments against impeachment: (1)
impeachment requires a criminal act, which, they argued, was absent here;
(2) impeachment violated President Trump’s free speech rights; and (3)
Congress cannot impeach former officials. 214 All of these arguments
uniformly failed.

1. Criminal Act
Of President Trump’s defenses, his argument that impeachment was
limited to criminal acts was his weakest. In President Trump’s opposition
brief, his legal team argued, “It matters greatly that the President did not
commit a crime, because the Constitutional requirement for action that is
grounds for impeachment is a high crime or misdemeanor.” 215 The brief
cited a statement by Professor Jonathan Turley, indicating that every
impeachment in our country’s history has been based on violations of
existing law. 216 This statement by Professor Turley, as the House Reply Brief
pointed out, did not stand for the proposition that impeachable acts must
involve criminal misconduct. 217 In fact, in the same written statement to
Congress, Professor Turley himself acknowledged that impeachable acts are
not limited to criminal offenses. 218 Moreover, no serious constitutional law
scholar argues that a president can only be impeached for criminal
misconduct. 219
See PROCEEDINGS OF THE UNITED STATES SENATE IN THE IMPEACHMENT OF PRESIDENT
DONALD JOHN TRUMP, PART II: TRIAL MEMORANDUM OF DONALD J. TRUMP, 45TH
PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 117TH CONG., 1ST SESS., S. DOC. NO.
117–2, at 107 (2021) [hereinafter Opposition Brief].
213

214
215
216

Id.
Id. at 182.
Id.

PROCEEDINGS OF THE UNITED STATES SENATE IN THE IMPEACHMENT OF PRESIDENT
DONALD JOHN TRUMP, PART III: REPLY MEMORANDUM OF THE UNITED STATES HOUSE
OF REPRESENTATIVES, 117TH CONG., 1ST SESS., S. DOC. NO. 117–2, at 215 (2021)
[hereinafter Reply Brief].
Id. at 215 n.102.
See Richard Lempert, Does Impeachment Require Criminal Behavior? In a Word, “No”,
BROOKINGS (Jan. 29, 2020), https://www.brookings.edu/blog/fixgov/2020/01/29/does217
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As mentioned previously, the British concept of impeachment—from
which our version of impeachment was borrowed—was also not limited to
criminal conduct. 220 “Impeachment was conceived in the English Parliament
as a method to control the King’s ministers” and, thus, included noncriminal offenses such as “abuse of power, corruption, and neglect of
duty.” 221 Early American history demonstrated the same. For example,
Congress has impeached several judges for non-criminal conduct. Judge
Ritter was removed in 1936 “for the non-criminal act of bringing his court
into scandal and disrepute,” and Judge Archbald was removed in 1912 for
“non-criminal speculation in coal properties.” 222 And while President Nixon
resigned before the House could impeach him, the Judiciary Committee’s
allegations also contained non-criminal acts. 223
Considering history and precedent, President Trump’s lawyers were
left without a leg to stand on. While President Trump’s lawyers argued for
a narrow—and quite literal—interpretation of high crimes and
misdemeanors, that is not how the Founders intended impeachment be
defined. 224 Impeachment was designed to address “violation of some public
trust.” 225 While that often does involve criminal conduct, it is not a
requirement.

2. Free Speech
President Trump’s First Amendment defense did not fare any better.
President Trump’s lawyers centered the bulk of their defense on the First
Amendment argument. 226 They contended that it was “undeniable that the
First Amendment’s protections flow to [President Trump]” and for
Congress to punish him for exercising his freedom of speech “would be to
do a grave injustice to the freedom of speech in this country.” 227 In response
to this defense, 144 constitutional lawyers from around the country from
both sides of the aisle—including a founder of the Federalist Society, Steven
Calabresi, and the former solicitor general under Ronald Reagan, Charles
Fried—called the First Amendment defense “legally frivolous.” 228 “[A]sking
impeachment-require-criminal-behavior-in-a-word-no/ [https://perma.cc/4V5H-G6P4].
Alan Dershowtiz is one exception. Id. “He acknowledge[d] that his view is a minority
viewpoint among scholars.” Id. Moreover, even he does not strictly apply the rule, as he as
stated that “it is enough that the charged conduct be ‘akin to treason and bribery.’” Id.
See supra Section II.A.
Reply Brief, supra note 217, at 215.
Id. at 216.
220
221
222
223
224
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Id.
See THE FEDERALIST NO. 64, supra note 44, at 360 (Alexander Hamilton).
Id.
See Opposition Brief, supra note 213, at 146–47, 154.
Id.
Nicholas Fandos, 144 Constitutional Lawyers Call Trump’s First Amendment Defense
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whether President Trump was engaged in lawful First Amendment activity
misses the point entirely,” they wrote. 229 “The First Amendment limits the
government’s ability to make it unlawful to engage in speech” while
impeachment, in contrast, “is not limited to unlawful acts.” 230 Thus, the
lawyers concluded, “[T]he First Amendment simply does not apply here.” 231
Even if it did apply, the “President’s speech and conduct around January 6
constitute unprotected incitement.” 232
The purpose of impeachment, as the House Managers emphasized in
their Reply Brief, is not to “punish” an official. 233 Congress was not seeking
to punish President Trump for his speech. Rather, impeachment serves to
“protect the Nation from a President who violated his oath of office and
abused the public trust.” 234 Maybe President Trump’s defense would have
had weight if it were a criminal proceeding, but, for impeachment, it
certainly did not make sense.

3. Removal of Former Officials
President Trump’s final argument was perhaps his strongest: Congress
cannot impeach former officials. But constitutional scholars still
overwhelmingly rejected the argument. 235 Many Republican Senators
grasped onto this point when justifying their vote to acquit. 236 It was the
support of Republican Senators, not the legal merits of the argument, that
made it President Trump’s strongest.
Legally, the argument failed. As the House Managers noted in their
briefs, there is precedent, in both England and early America, for the Senate

‘Legally
Frivolous’,
N.Y.
TIMES
(Feb.
5,
2021),
https://www.nytimes.com/2021/02/05/us/trump-defense-first-amendment.html
[https://perma.cc/7JXY-5DMK].
Lawyers Call Trump’s Defense ‘Legally Frivolous’, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 5, 2021),
https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2021/02/05/us/first-amendment-lawyers-trumpimpeachment-defense.html [https://perma.cc/N2GZ-5W3P].
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231

Id.
Id. (“The First Amendment protects the freedoms of speech, press, religion, assembly,

and petition; it does not grant the President the freedom to engage in a willful dereliction of
duty.”).
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Reply Brief, supra note 217, at 208.
Id.
See Constitutional Law Scholars on Impeaching Former Officers, POLITICO (Jan. 21,
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2021),
https://www.politico.com/f/?id=00000177-2646-de27-a5f7-3fe714ac0000
[https://perma.cc/QZN2-9JGM].
After the impeachment, Senator Mitch McConnell stated, “We have no power to convict
and disqualify a former officeholder who is now a private citizen.” McConnell Speech After
Trump’s Impeachment Trial Acquittal, U.S. NEWS (Feb. 14, 2021),
https://www.usnews.com/news/politics/articles/2021-02-14/read-mcconnell-speech-aftertrumps-impeachment-trial-acquittal [https://perma.cc/2MSK-HDWM].
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trying an official after they leave office. 237 In fact, in eighteenth century
England, only former officials were impeached—Lord Chancellor
Macclesfield was impeached in 1725 after he left office, and Warren
Hastings was impeached in 1787 for “abuses he had committed as the
former Governor General of Bengal.” 238
Former officials have also been impeached in America. Senator
William Blount was impeached in 1797 for plotting to give Britain control
over pieces of Florida and Louisiana. 239 The Senate expelled Senator Blount
and then commenced an impeachment trial. 240 The case was ultimately
dismissed “on the ground that Members of Congress are not subject to the
impeachment power at all,” but it still serves as an example of Congress
conducting an impeachment trial against a former official. 241 The second
example occurred in 1876 with the impeachment of former Secretary of
War William Belknap. 242 When the House Committee on Expenditures
uncovered that Secretary Belknap was stealing money from the government,
Secretary Belknap promptly resigned. 243 After his resignation, the House
voted to impeach him. 244 Although Secretary Belknap argued that the Senate
lacked jurisdiction because he was no longer in office, “the Senate voted 37
to 29 that it had jurisdiction.” 245 While neither Senator Blount nor Secretary
Belknap were ultimately convicted, the Senate did not question its
jurisdiction over the cases despite the fact that neither party was currently in
office.
Moreover, the House Managers pointed out a potential loophole that
would be created if former presidents could not be impeached. They
argued,
If the Senate does not try President Trump (and convict him) it
risks declaring to all future Presidents that there will be no
consequences, no accountability, indeed no Congressional
response at all if they violate their Oath to ‘preserve, protect and
defend the Constitution’ in their final weeks in office. 246
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House Brief, supra note 2, at 72.
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Id. at 94.
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The Senate would effectively be creating a “January Exception” for
future presidents. 247 That precedent, they argued “would horrify the
Framers.” 248
V.

THE RISE OF HYPERPARTISANSHIP AND THE DEGRADATION OF
IMPEACHMENT

Despite the weakness of President Trump’s defenses, only fifty-seven
senators voted to convict on February 13, 2021. 249 While the seven
Republican votes for conviction were significant, they ultimately were not
enough to reach the sixty-seven votes necessary for disqualification. 250 The
failed second impeachment of President Trump was the ultimate test of the
impeachment elements. Even when handed the most textbook example of
an impeachable offense, Congress was unable to convict the president.
Impeachment failed because the country lacked both a fully divided
government and broad public support for impeachment. Without all three
elements, even the most egregious abuse of power will go unchecked. The
rise of hyperpartisanship in America and the normalization of impeachment
have further reinforced the unyielding nature of the impeachment elements
and have made it increasingly difficult to obtain broad public support for
impeachment. This Section examines how political polarization and the
normalization of impeachment have weakened the impeachment tool.

A. Political Polarization
Since the mid-1970s, we have seen a continuous rise in party
polarization. 251 This hyperpartisanship has made it harder to find middle
ground between the Republican and Democratic parties. Without the ability
to reach a political consensus, the power of impeachment as an effective
check on executive power continues to deteriorate. The rise of
hyperpartisanship can be attributed, in part, to three movements: (1) the
civil rights movement and Republican control of the South; (2) the culture
wars of the 1980s; and (3) the growth of social media.
While the Republican party was initially the party pushing for the
247
248

Id.
Id.

Weiyi Cai, Annie Daniel, Jon Huang, Jasmine C. Lee & Alicia Parlapiano, Trump’s
Second Impeachment: How the Senate Voted, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 13, 2021),
249

https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2021/02/13/us/politics/senate-impeachment-livevote.html [https://perma.cc/T9U7-6AGZ].
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See id.

Nolan McCarty, What We Know and Don’t Know About Our Polarized Politics, WASH.
POST
(Jan.
8,
2014),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkeycage/wp/2014/01/08/what-we-know-and-dont-know-about-our-polarized-politics/
[https://perma.cc/WK6N-ERZR].
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passage of civil rights legislation during Reconstruction, the party became
increasingly focused on fiscal rather than social policy. 252 Republicans
became the party of big business in the industrialized North. 253 At the same
time, Southern Democrats shifted their focus to state legislative efforts to
restrict Black citizens from voting. 254 Following Reconstruction, Southern
Democrats across the country passed legislation to disenfranchise Black
voters. 255 With a large portion of Black people unable to vote in the South,
the Republican party began to shift its focus to white interests. 256 Beginning
in the early twentieth century, Southern Republicans began intentionally
excluding Black citizens from leadership. 257 As the party purged its Black
leaders and became increasingly white-focused, more and more white
Southern Democrats moved to the Republican party. 258 Additionally,
President Franklin Roosevelt’s New Deal reforms in the 1930s resulted in
“significant expansions of government [and] worker power,” which
Southern Democrats were unhappy about. 259 This too led to the increasing
expansion of the Republican Party in the white South. At the same time,
Black voters were increasingly moving to the Democratic party. 260 When
Democratic President Lyndon B. Johnson signed the Civil Rights Act of
1964, the movement only intensified. 261 By the 1960s, the political landscape
was transformed. 262 The Republican party largely became the party of the
South. 263
The culture war following the Civil Rights movement only solidified
these changes and further polarized the parties. The culture war was
fundamentally “a battle of ideas.” 264 The 1960s and the Civil Rights
movement challenged traditional notions of race, gender, sexual orientation,

Republican Party, HISTORY (Feb. 1, 2021), https://www.history.com/topics/uspolitics/republican-party [https://perma.cc/DR66-FWRX].
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and religion. 265 It was a period of awakening in America that was
subsequently met with a strong backlash. 266 By the 1980s, America was
specifically focused on gender and sexual politics. 267 Women started to
question their role in society; abortion was legalized and the pro-life and
pro-choice divide grew larger; and the gay rights movement of the 1960s
collided with traditional sexual norms. 268 White evangelical Christians
mobilized in support of traditional family values and found their home in
the more conservative Republican Party. 269 While, in the mid-twentieth
century, there had been internal divisions in both the Republican and
Democratic parties around certain social issues, specifically related to race
and religion, these internal divisions began to dissipate in the latter half of
the century. 270 “Many issues that were once distinct from the party conflict
dimension have been absorbed into it.” 271 This resulted in increased party
polarization.
Finally, the growth of social media has contributed to
hyperpartisanship. With the creation of social media, more and more
people are getting their news exclusively through these platforms. 272 In 2016,
18% of United States adults said they often got their news from social
media. 273 By 2019, the percentage rose to 28%. 274 Moreover, the average age
of a Fox News viewer is now sixty-seven years old, and the average CNN
viewer is nearly sixty-two. 275 Those who get their news from social media are
less likely to be informed about current events and more likely to be
exposed to conspiracy theories. 276 In fact, “[i]n 2013, for instance, a poll
found that 13 percent of US voters believed that President Barack Obama

Elinor
Burkett,
The Second Wave of Feminism,
https://www.britannica.com/topic/feminism/The-second-wave-of-feminism
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was literally the Antichrist.” 277 Additionally, a 2017 Pew Research Center
study found that “[55] percent of Democrats and 49 percent of Republicans
said that the other party makes them feel ‘afraid.’” 278 “Those numbers jump
to 70 percent of Democrats and 62 percent of Republicans if we consider
‘highly engaged’ citizens.” 279 Social media platforms are calibrated to feed
users content that align with their perceptions, creating “ideological echo
chambers.” 280 While paper and television news outlets have long been
ideologically skewed, extreme partisanship has only intensified, with paper
and television news outlets increasingly highlighting “content with the biggest
emotional punch.” 281 Many people choose to read and listen to news content
that aligns exclusively with their beliefs even if the information is false, which
causes them to become further entrenched in their political ideology. 282
Hyperpartisanship makes it harder to reach political consensus.
“[C]ongressional voting patterns are more polarized than at any time since
the Civil War and Reconstruction era.” 283 Moreover, the country has
become geographically more polarized. In 2016, 60% of Americans lived in
“landslide” counties, where Republicans or Democrats won by at least
twenty points. 284 In contrast, “in 1992 only 38 percent of Americans lived in
a county that the Republican or Democratic presidential candidate carried
by 20 points or more.” 285 Given the political landscape as it stands today, the
likelihood of Congress agreeing on the use of impeachment is low. This
likelihood is made even lower by the fact that, since the 1990s,
impeachment has become normalized in our politics.

B. The Normalization of Impeachment
Prior to the Nixon presidency, few presidents had impeachment
resolutions brought in the House. In fact, before Nixon, “only five of [thirtysix] U.S. presidents had an impeachment resolution brought against
them.” 286 After President Nixon, five of the next eight presidents had
277
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See DiFonzo, supra note 280.
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impeachment resolutions brought against them in the House. 287 Now, it is
almost expected that the president will face calls for impeachment during
their term. 288 This has also made impeachment more political, further
deepening the partisan divide.
Perhaps no impeachment was more political than the impeachment of
President Clinton, who was charged with perjury and obstructing justice. 289
President Clinton had an affair with one of his White House aides, Monica
Lewinsky, beginning in November 1995. 290 When the story broke, President
Clinton denied the allegations during his testimony in a separate and
unrelated sexual harassment case involving Paula Jones. 291 But later
President Clinton testified that he did in fact have an affair with Ms.
Lewinsky. 292 On December 11, 1998, the case was made to impeach
President Clinton for lying under oath and obstructing justice. 293 And “[o]n
December 19, the House impeached Clinton.” 294
There is no question that perjury is wrong and, in certain contexts,
could constitute an impeachable offense. 295 In the case of President Clinton,
however, the perjury was not related to his executive duties, and it certainly
did not result in a constitutional crisis. 296 There was no sign that President
Clinton was unable to effectively govern the country, and “ordinary checks
and balances seemed fully capable of addressing any further objections to
how Clinton conducted himself while in office.” 297
Although the impeachment failed, it marked the beginning of its
normalization. Since the 1990s, calls for impeachment have become
standard political rhetoric. During President Bush’s first term, his popularity
slowly declined due to the Iraq war, his mishandling of Hurricane Katrina,
and his illegal surveillance of the public. 298 By December 2005, 32% of
287
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Republicans Take U.S. House, TEX. STAR TRIB. (Jan. 4, 2022),
https://www.texastribune.org/2022/01/04/ted-cruz-joe-biden-impeachment/
[https://perma.cc/H5UL-AYDW] (emphasis added).
President Clinton Impeached, HISTORY: THIS DAY IN HISTORY,
https://www.history.com/this-day-in-history/president-clinton-impeached
[https://perma.cc/ZVX3-UZLJ].
288

289

290
291
292
293
294

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

TRIBE & MATZ, supra note 46, at 21.
Similar to the duel between Burr and Hamilton, perjury was illegal, but it did not mean
Clinton was unable to fulfil his role as president. See supra Section III.C.
TRIBE & MATZ, supra note 46, at 21.
Id. at 178.
295
296

297
298

615

616

MITCHELL HAMLINE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 48:2

Americans agreed that President Bush should be impeached. 299 Those
numbers continued to rise, and in 2007, 36% of Americans supported
impeachment. 300 The call for impeachment was politically skewed: only 9%
of Republicans supported impeaching President Bush, while 58% of
Democrats were in favor. 301 Similarly, members of Congress called for
Barack Obama’s impeachment during his second term. 302 Prominent rightwing figures echoed this call. 303 In July 2014, 35% of Americans favored
impeaching President Obama. 304 The call for impeachment was also
partisan; 57–68% of Republicans supported impeaching President Obama,
compared to 8–13% of Democrats. 305 Impeachment rhetoric reached its
peak during the 2016 election. Before President Donald Trump was even
inaugurated, people predicted his eventual impeachment. 306 Prior to the
election, Republican lawmakers discussed impeaching Hillary Clinton if she
were to be elected. 307 Just two weeks into Trump’s presidency, one-third of
Americans supported impeachment. 308
While impeachment has never been an especially effective tool, it has
proven useful when necessary. President Nixon likely would not have
resigned if Congress had not called for his impeachment. 309 Furthermore,
even failed calls for impeachment had the effect of tempering presidential
action. After the failed impeachment of President Johnson, he
accomplished very little during the rest of his term. 310 Woodrow Wilson
referred to the 1870s as a “Congressional Government,” due to how weak
the presidency appeared to be following impeachment. 311 Whatever power
the impeachment tool had as a check on the executive power was tested in
the 1990s and onward. As our country has become more polarized and calls
for impeachment have become the norm, the effectiveness of impeachment
has been put into question. January 6 proved to be the ultimate test.
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DANGEROUS PRECEDENT

A. Other Checks or Fixes
Before January 6, 2021, there was unspoken hope that the worst
offenses would be enough to unite the country around impeachment. If not,
then how could a truly dangerous president be stopped? The aftermath of
January 6 proved many wrong. Without a fully divided government, broad
public support, and a threat to constitutional order, impeachment will be
ineffective. With our country’s current polarization, satisfying all three
elements seems unlikely. Some have argued that making the voting process
anonymous would prevent partisan politics from interfering as extensively
in the impeachment process; 312 however, as explained below, anonymous
voting would be difficult to achieve and would likely still invite partisan
politics. Others have urged Congress to gravitate away from the
impeachment tool, arguing that other mechanisms should be used to check
the executive branch. 313 While there are several other ways the executive
power could be checked, many of the most effective alternatives are rather
narrow in scope. Ultimately, these solutions fail to address the root of the
problem. While it is the executive power that needs to be controlled, the
failure to do so is ultimately a failure of Congress. The solution therefore
may be much more complicated. As constitutional law professor Frank O.
Bowman III stated, “Impeachment is not broken. Congress is broken.” 314

1. Make Voting Anonymous
One way to potentially temper the effect of hyperpartisanship on
impeachment would be to make the voting process for both articles of
impeachment and the impeachment trial anonymous. In theory, it sounds
like a reasonable idea. Then, those Representatives or Senators who would
otherwise feel pressured by their party to vote a particular way could vote
without such pressure. In President Trump’s second impeachment, the idea
of a secret ballot gained traction. 315
See Robert Alexander, The Case for Letting Senators Vote Secretly on Trump’s Fate,
CNN (Dec. 31, 2019, 12:14 PM), https://www.cnn.com/2019/12/29/opinions/secret-ballottrump-senate-impeachment-trial-alexander/index.html [https://perma.cc/VC6S-YPAD].
See Michael S. Rosenwald, There’s an Alternative to Impeachment or 25th Amendment
for Trump, Historians Say, WASH. POST (Jan. 12, 2021, 9:20 PM),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/history/2021/01/11/14th-amendment-trump-insurrectionimpeachment/ [https://perma.cc/NH6D-97J9].
How to Fix Impeachment, POLITICO (Dec. 6, 2019, 5:08 AM),
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A secret ballot, however, presents complications. First, there is the
question of whether a secret ballot would be constitutional. Article 1,
Section five provides that “the Yeas and Nays of the Members of either
House on any question shall, at the Desire of one fifth of those Present, be
entered on the Journal.” 316 That means that if fewer than one-fifth of the
House and Senate objected to a secret ballot then anonymous voting would
likely be constitutional. 317
Second, it would require significant bipartisanship. Those
Representatives and Senators who would feel pressured during the
impeachment vote would likely feel the same pressure to object to the secret
ballot. However, some argue that the Article 1, section 5 provision “is
subordinate to the specific constitutional provisions on impeachment,” 318
which hold that the Senate has the “sole power to try impeachments.” 319 In
that case, the Senate could call for a secret ballot with a simple majority. 320
If the Senate were to create a secret ballot as part of its impeachment power,
the Supreme Court would likely not intervene. 321
Third, even if the House and Senate could get support for the secret
ballot, there is nothing stopping Representatives and Senators from sharing
their vote with the public. In all likelihood, those who voted in-line with their
party would be the most outspoken about their vote. 322 By process of
elimination, it would be easy for the public to narrow-down who did not
vote along party lines.

2. Twenty-Fifth Amendment
When impeachment seems unfeasible, another possible “check” on
executive power is the Twenty-Fifth Amendment. 323 The Twenty-Fifth
Amendment was drafted shortly after President John F. Kennedy’s death in
1963. 324 The Constitution did not lay out procedures for replacing a
Philip Bump, Why a Secret Impeachment Vote Isn’t Going to Happen, WASH. POST (Jan.
26, 2021, 3:51 PM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2021/01/26/why-secretimpeachment-vote-isnt-going-happen/ [https://perma.cc/S652-EQJH] (quoting U.S. CONST.
art. 1, § 5).
316

317

See id.

Kmiec, supra note 315.
U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 2, cl. 6.
Kmiec, supra note 315.
See Nixon v. U.S., 506 U.S. 224, 225 (1993) (“[T]he commonsense and dictionary
meaning of the word “sole” indicate that this [impeachment] authority is reposed in the
Senate alone . . . and the contemporary commentary supports a reading of the constitutional
language as deliberately placing the impeachment power in the Legislature, with no judicial
involvement, even for the limited purpose of judicial review.”).
U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 5, cl. 3.
See U.S. CONST. amend. XXV, § 1.
How a National Tragedy Led to the 25th Amendment, NAT’L CONST. CTR. (Feb. 10,
2021),
https://constitutioncenter.org/blog/how-jfks-assassination-led-to-a-constitutionalamendment-2 [https://perma.cc/9GUZ-HXZ4].
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president or vice president in the event that they died, resigned, or were
otherwise unable to fulfill their duties. 325 Moreover, there was some
confusion as to who would replace Lyndon B. Johnson as vice president
after John F. Kennedy’s death. 326 The Twenty-Fifth Amendment was
“primarily designed to clarify the presidential order of succession.” 327
Section 1 states that the vice president shall become president if the
president dies, resigns, or is removed from office. 328 Section 2 then provides
that when there is a vacancy in the office of the vice president, “the President
shall nominate a Vice President who shall take office upon confirmation by
a majority vote of both Houses of Congress.” 329 Section 3 allows the vice
president to serve as acting president where the president provides a “written
declaration that he is unable to discharge the powers and duties of his
office.” 330 None of these sections are exactly “checks” on executive power as
they require unexpected circumstances, such as death, or they require direct
action from the president, in the form of a resignation or a written
declaration.
It is Section 4 that has been discussed as a potential check. 331 Section 4
of the Twenty-Fifth Amendment provides a “multistep process” for the
majority of cabinet members along with the vice president to declare the
president to be “unable to discharge the powers and duties of his office.” 332
The president could immediately send a response, stating that he is, in fact,
able to perform his duties. 333 The vice president and majority of the cabinet
would then have to send another declaration to the congressional leaders
reiterating their concerns. 334 Within twenty-one days, both houses of
Congress would have to vote on whether the president should be
permanently stripped of his position. 335 If the votes in both houses fell short
of the two-thirds requirement, then the president would resume his role. 336
The requirements of Section 4 are in many ways more onerous than
that of impeachment. Impeachment requires only a majority of the House
to approve an article of impeachment, whereas Section 4 requires a two-

325
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thirds vote from both houses of Congress. 337 Additionally, impeachment
does not require any action on behalf of the vice president or cabinet
members. 338 Even putting aside the strict requirements of Section 4, it is
unclear whether the Twenty-Fifth Amendment could be used for the same
conduct as impeachment. The amendment has been “invoked for short
periods of time when Presidents Ronald Reagan and George W. Bush
underwent medical procedures.” 339 In both of those instances, the vice
presidents only held power as acting president for a few hours. 340
Additionally, the amendment was used when Vice President Spiro T.
Agnew resigned in 1973 and again when President Richard Nixon resigned
the following year. 341
Section 4, however, has never been invoked. 342 Following the January
6 insurrection, members of President Trump’s cabinet allegedly had
conversations about whether the amendment should be invoked. 343 Senate
Minority Leader Chuck Schumer and House Speaker Nancy Pelosi both
released statements, calling on Vice President Pence and cabinet to invoke
the amendment. 344 Even Republican Representative Adam Kinzinger
echoed Schumer and Pelosi’s call, tweeting, “It’s with a heavy heart I am
calling for the sake of our Democracy that the Twenty-Fifth Amendment be
invoked.” 345 The amendment does not define what it means for the
president to be “unable to discharge the powers and duties of his office.” 346
While there may have been a case for invoking the amendment following
Compare id. (“Congress is required to assemble[] [and] determine[] by two-thirds vote of
both Houses that the President is unable to discharge the powers and duties of his office.”),
with U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2 (“The House of Representatives . . . shall have the sole Power of
Impeachment.”), and U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3 (“The Senate shall have the sole Power to try
all impeachments . . . And no Person shall be convicted without the Concurrence of two
thirds of the Members present.”).
See U.S. CONST. art. I §§ 2–3.
Caitlin O’Kane, What Is the 25th Amendment, and How Could a President Be Removed
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the January 6 insurrection, it ultimately was not invoked. Given the
requirements for invoking the amendment, it seems unlikely that the
amendment would be a reasonable substitute for the impeachment power,
especially considering the two-thirds voting requirement in Congress and
the fact that the vice president and cabinet members will usually be
members of the president’s political party.

3. Section 3 of the Fourteenth Amendment
A more realistic substitute for impeachment, but with a much narrower
scope, is Section 3 of the Fourteenth Amendment, which provides the
following:
No person shall be a Senator or Representative in Congress, or
elector of President and Vice President, or hold any office, civil
or military, under the United States, or under any state, who,
having previously taken an oath, as a member of Congress, or as
an officer of the United States, or as a member of any state
legislature, or as an executive or judicial officer of any state, to
support the Constitution of the United States, shall have engaged
in insurrection or rebellion against the same, or given aid or
comfort to the enemies thereof. But Congress may by a vote of
two-thirds of each House, remove such disability. 347
The Fourteenth Amendment was ratified after the Civil War, and
Section 3 was designed to prevent federal officers, military officials, and state
officials who served in the Confederacy from serving in any future office
within the federal or state government. 348 The Section was only enforced for
a few years until 1872 when “Congress granted an amnesty to most of the
men who were barred from office.” 349 Since then, the Section has not
received much attention.
The January 6 insurrection brought the provisions back to life.
Reporters and politicians began to discuss whether Section 3 could apply to
President Trump and other individuals who played a role in the January 6
insurrection. 350 Section 3 was designed to apply to former officers and thus
does not invoke the same constitutional questions as the impeachment of
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President Donald Trump. 351 Moreover, Section 3 requires only a majority
of each house of Congress to find that Section 3 is satisfied. 352
The downside of Section 3 is that it only covers a limited amount
of corrupt conduct. Unless the president engages in or encourages an
insurrection or rebellion, this Section will not be an effective check on
executive power. In the exceptional case of President Donald Trump,
however, this Section could, and still can, apply.

B. What It Means for Separation of Powers
Overall, it seems unlikely that either reforming impeachment or
utilizing other constitutional provisions will be an effective way to temper
the growing power of the executive branch. Ultimately, the problem is much
deeper rooted. Congress’s failure to hold President Trump accountable
speaks more to the state of Congress itself than it does the impeachment
process. A recent report by the Association of Former Members of
Congress found numerous endemic issues within Congress: “[T]he lack of
any real across-the-aisle relationships, a schedule that limits opportunities
for interaction, too much power concentrated in leadership, constant fundraising demands, discouragement of bipartisanship, [and] the negative
influence of round-the-clock media.” 353 Moreover, the shift towards working
remotely since the beginning of the pandemic has further intensified issues
and made bipartisanship more difficult. 354
The normalization of impeachment has also intensified since January
2021. On January 21, one day after President Biden’s inauguration,
Representative Marjorie Greene introduced a resolution for the
impeachment of Biden for abuse of power and other high crimes and
misdemeanors. 355 Then in August, Senator Lindsey Graham called for
President Biden’s impeachment over the country’s withdrawal from
Afghanistan. 356 The following month, Representative Lauren Boebert
introduced articles of impeachment against both President Biden and Vice
President Kamala Harris, alleging “collusion with the Taliban.” 357 While
351
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none of these calls for impeachment have been taken seriously, that is part
of the problem. Impeachment has been normalized and thus the threat of
impeachment is a feeble one. It also distracts Congress from other issues
and further polarizes the parties. As Congress fights amongst each other, the
power of the executive branch grows.
VII.

CONCLUSION

While no president has been impeached and convicted in our
country’s history, impeachment has been used in the past to temper
presidential power. As our country has become more polarized, the
usefulness of impeachment as both a deterrent and as a check on executive
authority has been put into question. This is, in large part, due to the failure
of Congress to unite around impeachment. Because Congress is our most
democratic institution, issues within Congress generally speak more broadly
to issues within our country. Currently, our country is too polarized to reach
a political consensus, even after an armed insurrection. Moreover,
impeachment has been weakened by its continued exploitation by both
parties in Congress. Without an effective impeachment tool, Congress will
have to rethink its checks on the executive branch.
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